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Legal Creativity in EU External Relations:
The Stabilization and Association Agreement
Between the EU and Kosovo
Peter Van ELSUWEGE*
This article puts the specific features of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
between the EU and Kosovo in perspective. In particular, it analyses how the unsolved issue of
Kosovo’s recognition affects the scope and content of the agreement. For this purpose, the SAA
with Kosovo is compared to the SAA with Serbia. Despite the at first sight comparable structure
of both agreements, the absence of mixity in the SAA with Kosovo as well as the reservations
regarding its international legal status lead to a number of noticeable differences, in particular as
far as the rules regarding entry and residence of Kosovo nationals are concerned.
1 INTRODUCTION
On 1 April 2016, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the
European Union (EU) and Kosovo entered into force.1 This agreement is remark-
able for a number of reasons. Most significantly, five EU Member States (Cyprus,
Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) do not recognize Kosovo as an independent
state and also the EU carefully avoids such a step. The Council decision on the
conclusion of the SAA unequivocally states that:
none of the terms, wording or definition used in this Decision and the attached text of the
Agreement, nor any recourse to all the necessary legal bases for the conclusion of the
Agreement, constitute recognition of Kosovo as an independent State nor does it con-
stitute recognition by individual Member States of Kosovo in that capacity where they
have not previously taken such a step.2
In line with the 2012 arrangements regarding the representation of Kosovo in
regional fora, an asterisk (*) is added after Kosovo’s name, indicating that ‘this
designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UN
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1 For the text of the agreement, see: OJ (2016) L 71/3.
2 Council Decision (EU) 2016/342 of 12 February 2016 on the Conclusion, on Behalf of the Union, of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community, of the One Part, and Kosovo*, of the Other Part, OJ (2016) L 71/1.
Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence’.3 In other words, the
EU remains officially neutral about the international legal status of Kosovo and the
conclusion of the SAA does not change this position.
Even though the EU has concluded several international agreements with
entities that were not recognized as sovereign states in the past,4 the SAA with
Kosovo is fundamentally different. The other agreements with non-recognized
entities were very specific or of a transitional nature. For instance, the
European Community concluded an Interim Association Agreement with the
Palestine Liberalization Organization (PLO) to be replaced by a Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) ‘as soon as conditions permit’.5
Despite the reference to ‘association’ in the title of the interim agreement, the
legal basis for association agreements6 had not been used.7 The SAA with
Kosovo, on the other hand, is a full-fledged Association Agreement which is
legally based upon Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(TFEU), in conjunction with Articles 37 and 31 (1) of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU). As such, it is a comprehensive framework agreement and not a
transitory or sectoral legal instrument. Moreover, the SAA with Kosovo is part
and parcel of a network of largely comparable SAAs concluded with the
Western Balkan countries in the framework of the so-called Stabilization and
Association Process (SAP).
In comparison to the other SAAs, the SAA with Kosovo stands out because it
is the only SAA that is not concluded by the EU and its Member States but by the
Union alone. Apparently, the choice for an ‘EU only’ rather than a ‘mixed’
agreement was a deliberate political choice to avoid problems during the
3 The 2012 EU-brokered deal between Kosovo and Serbia on Kosovo’s representation in regional fora
is sometimes also referred to as ‘the footnote agreement’, see: M. Spernbauer, EU Peacebuilding in
Kosovo and Afghanistan. Legality and Accountability 170 (Martinus Nijhoff 2014); See also W. Koeth, The
Serbia-Kosovo Agreement on Kosovo’s Regional Representation and the ‘Feasibility Study’: A Breakthrough in
EU-Kosovo Relations?, 18(1) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 127–144 (2013).
4 See e.g. Agreement for Trade and Cooperation Between the European Economic Community and Macau, OJ
(1992) L 404/27; Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation Between the
European Community, of the One Part and the Palestine Liberalisation Organisation (PLO) for the Benefit of the
Palestine Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the Other Part, OJ (1997) L 187/3; Agreement
Between the European Community and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China on the Readmission of Persons Residing Without Authorisation, OJ (2004) L 17/
25.
5 Preamble to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement between the EC and the PLO,
supra n. 4. OJ (1997).
6 Art. 238 EEC Treaty, later Art. 310 EC and now Art. 217 TFEU.
7 See further, M. Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community, Hague Academy
of International Law Recueil des Cours 401 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006); E. Lannon, L’accord d’association
intérimaire: Communauté européenne-O.L.P.: l’institutionnalisation progressive des relations euro-palestiniennes,
5 Revue des affaires européennes 177 (1997).
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ratification process.8 In particular, it implies that the agreement does not need to be
ratified by individual EU Member States. This not only significantly accelerated
the formal entry into force of the agreement but, most importantly, allowed the
EU to circumvent the delicate issue of recognition at the national level.
This contribution puts the specific legal features of the SAA with Kosovo in
the broader context of the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkan region. After
a brief overview of the evolution of EU-Kosovo relations, the legal techniques
used to overcome the EU’s policy dilemma in the region are scrutinized. This
dilemma implies that the EU seeks, on the one hand, full participation of Kosovo
in the SAP whereas, on the other hand, this ambition is complicated due to the
non-recognition policy of five EU Member States. The so-called ‘asterisk’ solu-
tion as well as the absence of mixity in the SAA are two mechanisms used to
reconcile the EU’s interests and the five Member States’ principled position on
the question of recognition. It is argued that this legal creativity has certain
consequences as far as the scope and content of the SAA with Kosovo is
concerned, when compared to the SAAs concluded with the other Western
Balkan countries, most notably Serbia. Moreover, the question remains how far
this form of legal creativity can be stretched in the framework of the EU’s
enlargement policy.
2 THE EU’S KOSOVO POLICY: DIVERSITY ON RECOGNITION
BUT UNITY IN ENGAGEMENT
Since the launch of the SAP in May 1999, the EU has claimed a leadership role in
the reconstruction of Kosovo and in the process of reconciliation with Serbia.9 For
this purpose, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari represented the EU in diplomatic
negotiations with the Serbian government and the Russian negotiator Viktor
Chernomyrdin.10 Significantly, the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as the EU
mediator was an initiative of the German Council Presidency in 1999. It was not
based on a formal procedure and, for this reason, his status and mandate always
remained somewhat unclear.11 Moreover, the Council had already formally
appointed Mr Wolfgang Petritsch, the Austrian ambassador to Serbia, as the EU
8 United Kingdom House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The EU and Kosovo: Stabilisation
and Association Agreement, Documents considered by the committee on 21 July 2015, http://www.
parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-scrutiny-committee/
publications/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
9 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 26 May 1999 on the
Stabilisation and Association Process for Countries of South-Eastern Europe, COM (1999) 235 final (1999);
Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council para. 62–77 (3–4 June 1999), http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
10 See Statement of the European Union on Kosovo, Bull. EU 1999-5, 1.3.18 (31 May 1999).
11 A. S. Maass, EU-Russia Relations 1999–2015. From Courtship to Confrontation 14 (Routledge 2016).
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Special Envoy to Kosovo.12 Notwithstanding this ambiguity surrounding the EU’s
external representation, the diplomatic negotiations between Ahtisaari and
Chernomyrdin paved the way for the adoption of UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 which provided for the departure of Serbian troops and the
deployment of an international civilian and security mission under the auspices
of the UN. This resolution has been regarded as a ‘historic turning point’ because
it de facto finished Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo despite a reference to ‘the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ in the
preamble.13
The EU became a key contributor to the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), managing its so-called Pillar IV
devoted to reconstruction and economic development.14 At the same time, the
Union further developed its regional approach towards the Western Balkan area.
The June 1999 Cologne European Council stressed the EU’s leading role in the
implementation of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and reaffirmed the
offer of developing ‘a new kind of contractual relationship […] with a prospect of
European Union membership’.15 The Zagreb Summit Declaration of November
2000, adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the EU and five Western
Balkan countries, officially endorsed the key principles of the SAP.16 Remarkably,
Kosovo was not even mentioned and also in the subsequent Feira European
Council conclusions, which declared that the SAP countries ‘are potential candi-
dates for EU membership’, the situation of Kosovo was largely ignored.17 It was
only later, in June 2003, that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General in Kosovo was invited at the EU-Western Balkans summit in
Thessaloniki. On this occasion, the EU reiterated ‘its unequivocal support to the
European perspective of the Western Balkan countries’.18 Yet, the implications of
this statement remained unclear as far as the territory of Kosovo was concerned.
12 Council of the EU, Joint Action 1999/239/CFSP in Relation to the Nomination of a Special Envoy for
Kosovo, OJ (1999) L 89/1.
13 W. Koeth, State Building Without a State: The EU’s Dilemma in Defining Its Relations with Kosovo, 15(2)
Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 227, 229 (2010).
14 The other three pillars concerned (1) humanitarian assistance, led by the office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees; (2) civil administration, led by the UN and (3) democratization and
institution building, under the guidance of the OSCE. See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/unmik/background.shtml (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
15 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council para. 72 (3–4 June 1999), http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
16 Zagreb Summit, Final Declaration (24 Nov. 2000), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/Declang4.doc.html (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
17 Presidency Conclusions, Feira European Council (19–20 June 2000), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
18 EU-Western Balkans Summit, Final Declaration (Thessaloniki 21 June 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
396 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
UN Resolution 1244 did not determine Kosovo’s international legal status and de
jure it was still a part of Serbia, albeit under the control of the international
community.
A Communication of the European Commission, issued on 20 April 2005,
provided some clarity in the sense that it unequivocally declared that ‘[t]he
European perspective of the Western Balkans, confirmed in the Thessaloniki
Declaration of June 2003, is also open to Kosovo’.19 The timing of this explicit
statement cannot be disconnected from the broader political context. As had been
observed by the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 21–22 February
2005, it became increasingly clear that Kosovo would not return to the situation
before 1999.20 The UNMIK had gradually transferred parts of its authority to the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. The process leading to the settlement
of Kosovo’s future status could no longer be postponed and started under the
leadership of Martti Ahtisaari, which was formally appointed as the special envoy of
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in November 2005.21 By making the European
perspective of Kosovo more tangible, the Commission aimed to integrate the
discussion about Kosovo’s future status in the EU’s regional approach towards
the Western Balkans. Moreover, there was a belief that Kosovo should not be left
behind when its neighbours began to move towards Europe. Of course, the
rhetoric regarding Kosovo’s European vocation could not conceal the uncertainty
regarding its international legal status and the internal division among the EU
Member States on this issue. The Commission, therefore, also acknowledged that
the possibility of negotiating a full-fledged SAA with Kosovo was ‘not on the table
at present’. Nevertheless, it promised ‘creative ways to ensure that Kosovo can
fully benefit from all EU instruments and – depending on the outcome of status
talks – in due course engage in contractual relations with the Union as
appropriate’.22
Without entering into a full reconstruction of the process leading to the
unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence on 17 February 2008, it suffices
to recall that the divergence of interests amongst the EU Member States made it
impossible for the EU to adopt a common position on this matter.23 As a result,
the Council determined that each Member State would decide alone on its
relations with Kosovo.24 This lack of internal agreement on recognition did not
19 Communication from the Commission, A European Future for Kosovo, COM (2005) 156 final.
20 Council of the EU, 2641th Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, doc. 6420/05, 11 (Brussels 21
Feb. 2005).
21 UN doc. S/2005/708.
22 Communication from the Commission, A European Future for Kosovo, COM (2005) 156 final, 4.
23 See also Koeth, supra n. 13.
24 Council of the EU, 2851th Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Conclusions on Kosovo, doc.
6262/08 (18 Feb. 2008).
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prevent the EU to appoint a special representative25 and to deploy an EU Rule of
Law Mission (EULEX) in the framework of its European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) (now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)).26
Moreover, Kosovo takes part in the SAP and benefits from financial assistance
under the Instrument for Pre-accession and other initiatives. The approach of
‘diversity on recognition but unity in engagement’ became the official mantra of
the EU’s Kosovo policy.27 Proceeding from this perspective, the European
Commission launched a feasibility study for a SAA between the EU and Kosovo
in 2012. As part of this exercise, the Commission found that such an agreement
‘can be concluded in a way that it respects the positions of the Member States on
the status of Kosovo’.28 In the Commission’s view, the Union’s capacity to
conclude international agreements is not limited to generally recognized indepen-
dent states. The only crucial prerequisite is that the political and judicial authorities
of the third party are capable to ensure that the terms of the agreement are
respected, applied and implemented.29
Significantly, the evolution of EU-Kosovo relations is fully embedded in
the regional strategy of the SAP and conditional upon progress in the normal-
ization of relations with Serbia. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that
the Commission’s feasibility study followed the 24 February 2012 Serbia-
Kosovo agreement on Kosovo’s regional representation. As a result of this
deal, Kosovo can participate in international meetings at regional level as an
entity in its own rights, provided the nameplate includes an asterisk referring to
UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy at the time,
Catherine Ashton, and European Commissioner for enlargement, Stefan Füle,
quickly observed that this arrangement allowed for progress in the development
of contractual relations between the EU and Kosovo, with the Commission’s
feasibility study as a first step.30 Serbia, for its part, was rewarded with a formal
recognition as ‘candidate country’ for EU membership. A largely comparable
scenario of EU meditation and parallel progress in the EU’s relations with
Kosovo and Serbia took place when the ‘First agreement of principles
25 Council of the EU, Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP of 4 February 2008, OJ (2008) L 42/88.
26 Council of the EU, Joint Action 2008/124 CFSP of 4 February 2008, OJ (2008) L 42/92.
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Kosovo* – Fulfilling Its
European Perspective, COM (2009) 5343, 4.
28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Feasibility Study for a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement Between the European Union and Kosovo*, COM (2012) 602 final,
12.
29 Ibid., at 3.
30 Joint Statement of High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Stefan Füle on the
Agreements Reached in the Latest Round of Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue (Brussels 24 Feb. 2012), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-133_en.htm (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
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governing the normalization of relations’ between both parties was signed in
Brussels on 19 April 2013.31 Three days later, the Commission recommended
the EU Member States to launch EU accession negotiations with Serbia and, at
the same time, proposed a Council decision authorizing the opening of nego-
tiations on a SAA with Kosovo.32 The most recent example of the EU’s
successful diplomatic engagement in the region is the parallel conclusion in
August 2015 of four additional agreements between Kosovo and Serbia dealing
with energy, telecoms, the status of the Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo
and freedom of movement over the Mitrovica bridge.33 The EU’s new High
Representative, Federica Mogherini, called the agreements ‘a landmark
achievement’ in the normalization process which ‘will enable both sides to
advance on their European path’.34 Nothing, therefore, prevented the signature
of the SAA between the EU and Kosovo on 27 October 2015 and the opening
of the first negotiating chapters with Serbia in December 2015.
The EU’s strategy of constructive and parallel engagement with Serbia and
Kosovo is generally regarded as a successful illustration of its normative power.35
The EU’s enlargement policy in general and the SAP in particular create the
preconditions for the promotion of good neighbourly relations despite the very
dense and sensitive political climate. In this respect, it is noteworthy that both
parties agreed that ‘neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the
other side’s progress in their respective EU paths’. This commitment, which is
part of the 2013 deal on the principles governing the normalization of relations,
is also reflected in the EU’s negotiating framework for the EU accession of
Serbia. This document explicitly provides that Serbia’s engagement towards ‘a
visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo’ is expected to
lead to ‘the comprehensive normalization of relations […] in the form of a
legally binding agreement by the end of Serbia’s accession negotiations’.36 The
issue of normalization of relations with Kosovo is addressed as an item under
negotiating Chapter 35, entitled ‘other issues’, which was officially opened on
31 Sometimes, reference is therefore made to the ‘Brussels Agreement’. See e.g. R. Caplan & S. Wolff,
Some Implications of the Advisory Opinion for Resolution of the Serbia-Kosovo Conflict, in The Law and Politics
of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 323 (M. Milanovic & M. Wood eds, OUP 2015).
32 European Commission, Serbia and Kosovo*: Historic Agreement Paves the Way for Decisive Progress in Their
EU Perspectives (Brussels 22 Apr. 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-347_en.htm
(accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
33 European External Action Service, Statement by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini
Following the Meeting of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue (Brussels 25 Aug. 2015), http://eeas.europa.eu/
statements-eeas/2015/150825_02_en.htm (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
34 Ibid.
35 Koeth, supra n. 3, at 141.
36 Intergovernmental Conference on Accession of Serbia to the European Union, Negotiating Framework, doc. AD
1/14, 11 (Brussels 9 Jan. 2014).
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14 December 2015.37 In this context, the EU made it crystal clear that progress
in Serbia’s accession process to the EU goes hand in hand with positive devel-
opments in the bilateral relations between Serbia and Kosovo. A failure to ensure
sufficient progress in the normalization process may lead to the suspension of the
accession negotiations.38 Significantly, a similar form of conditionality is
included in Article 5 of the SAA with Kosovo.39 This provision defines
Kosovo’s commitment to a visible and sustainable improvement of its relations
with Serbia as an ‘essential principle’ of the agreement. Non-compliance with
this commitment may lead to a suspension of the SAA. Moreover, the normal-
ization of relations with Serbia is part of the established political dialogue. Article
13 of the SAA repeats that this should gradually lead to a comprehensive
settlement ‘in the form of a legally binding agreement’.40 In other words, the
EU framework for accession negotiations with Serbia and the SAA with Kosovo
are complementary instruments of the EU facilitated dialogue for the normal-
ization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Arguably, the EU’s leverage in promoting a normalization of Serbia-
Kosovo relations largely depends upon its ability to deliver. So far, every step
in the reconciliation process was almost immediately followed by a concrete
reward such as the recognition of the EU candidate status and the opening of
accession negotiations as far as Serbia is concerned and steps in the procedure
leading to the conclusion of a SAA with Kosovo (cf. supra). The ambiguity
surrounding Kosovo’s legal status and the EU’s indecisive position on this issue
did not affect the Union’s role in the region. Nevertheless, this approach is not
without consequences. It requires a flexible interpretation of the existing legal
practice and unavoidably affects the scope of the EU-Kosovo SAA in compar-
ison to the SAAs concluded with the other countries in the region, most
notably Serbia.
3 CIRCUMVENTING THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION: THE
ASTERISK SOLUTION AND THE ABSENCE OF MIXITY
In its feasibility study for a SAA between the EU and Kosovo, the European
Commission firmly concluded that ‘there is no legal obstacle’ to conclude such an
agreement despite the fact that some Member States do not recognize Kosovo as
37 Second Meeting of the Accession Conference with Serbia at Ministerial Level (Brussels 14 Dec. 2015), http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/14-accession-conference-serbia/
(accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
38 Ibid.
39 Stabilisation and Association Agreement Between the European Union and the Atomic Energy Community, of
the One Part, and Kosovo*, of the Other Part, OJ (2016) L 71/3.
40 Ibid., Art. 13.
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an independent state.41 Two legal techniques proved useful to overcome this issue.
On the one hand, an asterisk and footnote are added after Kosovo’s name to clarify
that the agreement does not affect the EU Member States’ positions on the legal
status of Kosovo (the so-called ‘asterisk solution’). On the other hand, in contrast
to all other SAAs, the SAA with Kosovo is concluded by the EU alone and not by
the EU and its Member States. As a result, individual EU Member States did not
need to sign or ratify the agreement.
3.1 THE ASTERISK SOLUTION
The use of an asterisk (*) after Kosovo’s name is a direct result of the 2012
agreement on regional cooperation and representation between Serbia and
Kosovo after mediation on behalf of the EU’s representative Mr Robert
Cooper.42 This agreement allows Kosovo to participate in regional organizations
and to sign agreements on its own account with the disclaimer that this does not
imply a recognition of Kosovo’s independence at the international stage. In
practical terms, this means that ‘Kosovo*’ is the only acceptable denomination in
official documents and meetings. The accompanying text in footnote states that ‘[t]
his designation is without prejudice to the positions on status, and is in line with
UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence’.
The formulation of this footnote text is a diplomatic compromise revealing
the absence of a consensus on the international legal status of Kosovo. On the one
hand, it refers to UNSCR 1244 which de jure confirms Serbia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity. For many Serbs, it is therefore regarded as a protection against
Kosovo’s independence: as long as it is in place Kosovo is technically speaking
considered to be a part of Serbia.43 On the other hand, the reference to the ICJ
Opinion is important for Kosovo since it concluded that the 2008 declaration of
independence is not illegal. Hence, it appears that the two references outweigh
each other leading to a neutral position as far as the question of Kosovo’s status is
concerned.44
The official EU position of ‘status neutrality’ is abundantly confirmed in all
official documents regarding the SAA. It can be found in the Council decisions on
41 Supra n. 28.
42 Council of the EU, EU Facilitated Dialogue: Agreement on Regional Cooperation and IBM Technical Protocol
(Brussels 24 Feb. 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/for
aff/128138.pdf. The text of the arrangement is available at: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/reposi
tory/docs/agreement_0210_representation.pdf (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
43 A. McKinna, Notes on the 15th Anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (2014), http://www.
balkanalysis.com/kosovo/2014/06/10/notes-on-the-15th-anniversary-of-un-security-council-resolu
tion-1244/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
44 Koeth, supra n. 13, at 231.
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the signing and conclusion of the SAA, in a unilateral declaration on behalf of
the Union issued at the moment of signature and in the text of SAA itself. In
addition to the asterisk and footnote in the title of the agreement and the same
formula in the preamble, Article 2 of the SAA explicitly provides that ‘[n]one
of the terms, wording or definitions used in this Agreement, including the
Annexes and Protocols thereto, constitute recognition of Kosovo by the EU as
an independent State nor does it constitute recognition by individual Member
States of Kosovo in that capacity where they have not taken such a step’.45
Hence, in formal legal terms, the SAA does not affect the EU’s neutral position
on the recognition of Kosovo. In practice, however, the conclusion of a legally
binding framework agreement may be regarded as a de facto acceptance of
Kosovo’s sovereignty. After all, it implies that the Kosovo authorities are
considered capable to ensure that the terms of the agreement are respected,
applied and implemented.
Arguably, the asterisk codifies the EU’s policy of ‘treating Kosovo as a
virtual country without recognising it as a state’.46 Whereas this approach
allowed to make significant progress in the reconciliation process, the use of
the asterisk does not solve the core of the issue. It creates an atmosphere of
‘constructive ambiguity’ but neither side is particularly happy with the result. In
Kosovo’s official circles, the asterisk is regarded as an obstacle to full integration
in the international community of states. For this reason, Kosovo’s representa-
tives attempt to downplay its significance. In the negotiations on the SAA, for
instance, the Kosovo government insisted that the asterisk would only be used
in the title and at the beginning of the agreement but not in the body of the
text and also in practice Kosovo representatives try to circumvent the asterisk
formula wherever possible.47 In Serbia, on the other hand, the asterisk is
considered an inevitable compromise on the path to EU membership which,
however, does not imply a fundamental change in the country’s approach
regarding the status of Kosovo.48 Also within the EU, the long-term sustain-
ability of the asterisk solution is under discussion. The European Parliament, for
instance, raised concerns about the implications of ‘status neutrality’ for the
credibility of the EU’s external policy in general and its pre-accession strategy
in particular.49
45 Art. 2, SAA EU-Kosovo, supra n. 39.
46 Koeth, supra n. 13, at 227.
47 F. Bailey, Kosovo Still Dogged by Status-Neutral Asterisk, http://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-still-
dogged-status-neutral-asterisk-mag/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).
48 M. Poznatov, Serbia Confirms It Will Not Recognise Kosovo, Euractiv.com (20 Oct. 2015).
49 European Parliament Resolution of 4 February 2016 on the 2015 Report on Kosovo, P8_TA (2016) 0047,
para. 8.
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3.2 THE SAA WITH KOSOVO AS AN ‘EU ONLY’ AGREEMENT
Apart from the addition of the asterisk, the conclusion of the SAA as an ‘EU only’
agreement and not as a mixed agreement involving the EU and its Member States
helped overcome the challenge of (non-)recognition. Traditionally, association
agreements tend to be mixed for a number of reasons.50 First, they are typically
comprehensive in nature providing a general framework for cooperation involving
areas belonging to EU and Member State competences. Second, mixity is often a
pragmatic solution to avoid internal competence battles among EU institutions and
Member States. Third, the political importance of association agreements explains
why Member States prefer to be a contracting party in their own right, in addition
to the EU. It not only endows them with additional bargaining power during the
negotiations and in the ratification process but also upholds their visibility vis-à-vis
third countries.51 Hence, the choice for mixity is not necessarily a result of legal
orthodoxy but frequently the consequence of crude political interests on behalf of
the Member States.
Somewhat paradoxically, political considerations also explain why the SAA
with Kosovo is not a mixed agreement. The five EU Member States which do not
recognize Kosovo as an independent state opposed the negotiation of an agreement
which would require their signature and domestic approval. As a result, the
negotiating directives were confined to areas of EU competence only.52 Both
the Council Decisions on the signing and on the conclusion of the SAA also
explicitly provide that ‘[t]he commitments and cooperation to be entered into by
the Union under this Agreement relate only to the areas covered by the EU acquis
or existing Union policies’.53
The absence of mixity does not imply that the SAA with Kosovo is limited to
the EU’s exclusive competences. The agreement includes numerous areas of shared
competences as well as a title devoted to political dialogue. Establishing a frame-
work for political dialogue is even a key objective of the agreement.54 This may
appear remarkable taking into account that the addition of a provision on ‘political
dialogue’ used to be a common technique to make an agreement mixed in the pre-
Lisbon period.55 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the establishment
50 Apart from the SAA with Kosovo, only the Association Agreements with Cyprus and Malta, signed
respectively in 1970 and 1972 were not mixed since they only covered the gradual establishment of a
customs union. See M. Maresceau, A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements, in Mixed Agreements
Revisited. The EU and Its Member States in the World 19 (C. Hillion & P. Koutrakos eds, Hart
Publishing 2010).
51 A. Rosas, The Future of Mixity, in Hillion & Koutrakos (eds), supra n. 50, at 367–374.
52 United Kingdom House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, supra n. 8.
53 See OJ (2015) L 290/4 and OJ (2016) L 71/1.
54 Art. 1 SAA EU-Kosovo, supra n. 39.
55 Maresceau, supra n. 50, at 16.
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of a political dialogue no longer automatically triggers the participation of the
Member States. Rather, it affects the substantive legal basis of the agreement
implying that in addition to Article 217 TFEU (on association) a specific reference
is added to Article 37 TEU (i.e. the EU’s capacity to conclude agreements in the
field of CFSP) in conjunction with Article 31 (1) TFEU (i.e. the specific decision-
making procedure in the field of CFSP). This new approach, which was also used
for the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, is a conse-
quence of the specific position of the CFSP in the unified EU legal order post-
Lisbon.56 It implies that as far as the CFSP aspects of the agreement are concerned,
the High Representative is representing the EU’s positions which are to be
adopted on the basis of unanimity.
Be that it may, the conclusion of the SAA with Kosovo as an EU-only
agreement raised concerns about the implications for the division of competences
among the EU and its Member States and for the EU’s treaty practice in general.
Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom (UK) had reservations regarding the accep-
tance of an EU-only agreement covering a wide range of matters where compe-
tence is shared with the Member States. In order to avoid that the Kosovo SAA
would develop into a precedent for circumventing mixity, the UK insisted on the
inclusion of the caveat that:
The signing and conclusion of this Agreement is without prejudice to the nature and scope of any
similar agreements to be negotiated in the future. It is also without prejudice to the powers of the EU
institutions conferred on them in the Treaties and the positions of EU institutions and Member States
on competences.57
Significantly, Opinion 2/15 of the EU Court of Justice raises questions about the
legality of so-called ‘facultative’ EU-only agreements such as the SAA with
Kosovo. In particular, the consideration that rules belonging to the EU’s shared
competence ‘cannot be approved by the European Union alone’ seems to imply
the mandatory involvement of the Member States in the procedure for concluding
such agreements.58 However, Daniel Thym offers an alternative reading based
upon the argument that the EU can activate non-exclusive implied powers as long
56 See e.g. A. Dashwood, The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action, in The European Union in the
World. Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau 3–16 (I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam
eds, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014); and, in the same volume, S. Adam, The Legal Basis of
International Agreements of the European Union in the Post-Lisbon Era 65–86.
57 See United Kingdom House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, supra n. 8; as well as the
Council Decisions on the Signing and Conclusion of the EU-Kosovo SAA, OJ (2015) L 290/4 and OJ (2016)
L 71/1.
58 See Opinion 2/15 (Singapore FTA), EU:C:2017:376, paras 244 & 292. For comments, see e.g. D.
Kleimann & G. Kübek, The Singapore Opinion or the End of Mixity as We Know It, http://verfassungs
blog.de; and G. Van der Loo, The Court’s Opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA: Throwing off the Shackles of
Mixity?, https://www.ceps.eu (accessed 31 May 2017).
404 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
as the agreement does not involve matters falling within the exclusive competence
of the Member States.59 Such an understanding of the implied powers doctrine
solves the potential competence questions surrounding the SAA with Kosovo.
Leaving this internal constitutional discussion aside, it is obvious that political
motivations inspired the EU to stretch the scope of its competences in the
agreement with Kosovo. A comparison with the other SAAs, most notably the
one with Serbia, reveals the limits of this approach.
4 COMPARING THE SAAs WITH KOSOVO AND SERBIA:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU’S LEGAL CREATIVITY
The objectives of the SAA with Kosovo and the SAA with Serbia are identical60
and also the structure of both agreements is very similar. Nevertheless, at closer
inspection, a number of remarkable differences can be discerned.
First, whereas Serbia is explicitly recognized as ‘a potential candidate for EU
membership’, the preamble to the SAA with Kosovo carefully avoids such word-
ing. Instead, it recalls that Kosovo’s participation in the SAP and the implementa-
tion of the SAA ‘will lead to progress in Kosovo’s European perspective and
rapprochement with the EU, should objective circumstances so permit and
Kosovo fulfil the criteria defined by the European Council in Copenhagen on
21–22 June 1993 and the aforementioned conditionalities’.61 In other words, the
preamble is a textbook example of blurred diplomatic language illustrating the
ambiguities surrounding the EU’s relations with Kosovo, which is included in the
EU’s enlargement strategy but cannot be offered a clear perspective of potential
membership as long as the status issue is not resolved. The abundant use of the
caveat ‘should objective circumstances so permit’ in the preamble but also in
several provisions of the SAA further reveals the uncertainties regarding the
development of EU-Kosovo relations.
Second, the peculiarity of Kosovo resulted in the inclusion of specific clauses
which cannot be found in other SAAs. There is, for instance, a ‘non-recognition
clause’62 as well as specific provisions regarding Kosovo’s relations with Serbia.63
Kosovo’s commitment towards ‘a visible and sustainable improvement in relations
with Serbia’ and ‘effective cooperation’ with the EULEX mission are ‘essential
principles’ which, in case of non-compliance, may lead to a suspension of (parts of)
59 D. Thym, Mixity After Opinion 2/15, Judicial Confusion of Shared Competences, http://verfassungsblog.be
(accessed 31 May 2017).
60 Compare Art. 1 (2) of the SAA with Kosovo and Art. 1 (2) of the SAA with Serbia.
61 Preamble to the EU-Kosovo SAA.
62 Art. 2 of the EU-Kosovo SAA.
63 Arts 5 and 13 of the EU-Kosovo SAA.
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the agreement.64 Moreover, the political dialogue between the EU and Kosovo is
directly linked to the process of normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. Article
13 of the SAA codifies the basic principles of this process such as the commitment
that neither side will block the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths
and the end goal of a comprehensive settlement of all outstanding issues in the
form of a legally binding agreement. For this purpose, Kosovo accepts a list of
commitments including inter alia the implementation in good faith of all agree-
ments with Serbia and the facilitation of the EULEX mission. Such an explicit
operationalization of the good neighbourliness principle is quite exceptional and
goes beyond the rather general neighbourhood clauses that can be found in the
other SAAs.65 Moreover, the Stabilization and Association Council (SAC) will
supervise the normalization process and may take decisions and issue recommen-
dations in this regard. Accordingly, the SAA complements the EU’s facilitated
dialogue for the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Third, the absence of mixity implies that the scope of the SAA with Kosovo
differs from the other SAAs. It implies, for instance, that the SAA with Kosovo
does not include a standard clause on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).66 Even though such a clause arguably falls within the scope of
the EU’s competences in the field of CFSP, it is traditionally only included in
mixed agreements.67 The UK, in particular, insisted on a narrow interpretation of
the CFSP elements in the SAA with Kosovo covering essentially the provisions on
political dialogue but with exclusion of elements such as those relating to WMD.68
Also in the other parts of the agreement, minor differences can be related to the
issue of competence division. For instance, the SAA with Kosovo explicitly
excludes portfolio investment from the scope of application of the chapter on
current payments and movement of capital whereas the SAA with Serbia provides
that the parties shall ensure, as from four years after its entry into force, free
movement of capital relating to portfolio investment and financial loans and credits
with maturity shorter than one year.69 This difference reflects the limits to the
scope of the EU’s competences in the field of investments as confirmed in Opinion
2/15 regarding the EU’s Free Trade Agreement with Singapore.70
64 Art. 5 of the EU-Kosovo SAA.
65 See e.g. Title III on regional cooperation in the SAA with Serbia. Of course, as was indicated earlier,
the principles governing the normalization of relations with Kosovo are incorporated in the EU
framework for accession negotiations with Serbia (see supra s. 2).
66 Such a clause is included in all other SAAs; see e.g. Art. 3 of the EU-Serbia SAA.
67 Council of the EU, Mainstreaming Non-Proliferation Policies into the EU’s Wider Relations with Third
Countries, doc. 14997/03, (19 Nov. 2003).
68 See United Kingdom House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, supra n. 8.
69 Compare Art. 65 of the EU-Kosovo SAA and Art. 63 (4) of the EU-Serbia SAA.
70 Opinion 2/15 (Singapore FTA), EU:C:2017:376.
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Another important implication of the EU-only nature of the agreement is the
absence of provisions on the right of entry and residence of Kosovo nationals. As
confirmed in the case law of the EU Court of Justice, this legislation falls, a priori,
within the competence of the Member States.71 Unlike the other SAAs, the
agreement with Kosovo therefore lacks a chapter devoted to ‘movement of
workers’.72 There is, for instance, no standstill provision on access requirements
to the national labour markets for Kosovo workers whereas such a clause is present
in the SAA with Serbia.73 The latter agreement also includes a non-discrimination
clause for legally employed Serbian workers and a derived right of access to the
national labour market for their legally resident spouse and children.74 The differ-
ences are also noticeable in the chapter on establishment where the SAA with
Kosovo only covers the right to take up economic activities by means of the setting
up of companies. The SAA with Serbia, on the other hand, also includes the right
of self-employment.75 The only rights for Kosovo nationals can be found in the
chapter on ‘supply of services’. This inter alia implies that a Kosovo company
established in the territory of the EU has the right to employ citizens of Kosovo
provided that such employees are ‘key personnel’ as defined under Article 55(2)
SAA. The SAA further endows the SAC with the task to gradually establish the
modalities to allow for the temporary entry and stay of service suppliers in the
territory of the other party.76
Significantly, the lack of provisions regarding the mobility of persons in the
SAA with Kosovo is partly compensated through the insertion of a specific legal
migration clause. The latter provides that ‘Kosovo citizens enjoy rights under the
EU acquis, notably in areas of working conditions, remuneration and dismissal,
family reunification, long-term residence, students, researchers and highly qualified
employees, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and pensions’.77 In other
words, despite the absence of the Member States as contracting parties to the
agreements, relevant EU directives dealing with specific and fragmented aspects of
mobility of third country nationals evidently apply to nationals of Kosovo.
Finally, it is noteworthy that on certain issues the SAA with Kosovo is more
advanced. There are, for instance, provisions devoted to cooperation with respect
71 Case C-304/14, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. CS, EU:C:2016:674, para. 30.
72 For instance, Title V of the EU-Serbia SAA is devoted to ‘movement of workers, establishment,
supply of services, movement of capital’ whereas Title V of the EU-Kosovo SAA is limited to
‘establishment, supply of services and capital’.
73 Art. 50 of the EU-Serbia SAA.
74 Art. 49 of EU-Serbia SAA.
75 Compare the definition of employment under Art. 50(4) of the EU-Kosovo SAA and Art. 52(d) of the
EU-Serbia SAA.
76 Arts 57–58 of the EU-Kosovo SAA.
77 Art. 86 of the EU-Kosovo SAA.
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to climate change and civil protection which cannot be found in the other SAAs.78
This can be attributed to the further development of the EU’s internal policies in
relation to those areas in comparison to the situation when the other SAAs were
under negotiation.
5 CONCLUSION
The EU-Kosovo SAA cannot be disconnected from the broader political context,
in particular the SAP for the Western Balkans and the process of reconciliation
between Serbia and Kosovo. So far, the EU has been quite successful in brokering
bilateral deals between Kosovo and Serbia. In return, both Kosovo and Serbia
could make significant steps forward in their process of rapprochement with the
EU. The opening of accession negotiations with Serbia and the conclusion of the
SAA with Kosovo are significant landmarks on the long and difficult journey
towards stabilization of the Western Balkans region. The EU used this opportunity
to codify its leadership role in this process and to operationalize the principle of
good neighbourliness as a key condition for further progress.79 This can be clearly
derived from the EU-Kosovo SAA and the framework for accession negotiations
with Serbia. Both documents refer to the end goal of a legally binding agreement
between Serbia and Kosovo and entail the commitment that neither party can
block the other in its European aspirations. In other words, the EU-Kosovo SAA is
a significant instrument to foster the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and
Pristina. Moreover, it provides a legal framework for political and economic
reforms on the basis of the so-called ‘European Reform Agenda’ (ERA).80
Be that as it may, the unresolved issue of Kosovo’s international legal status
implies that the EU-Kosovo SAA is an example of legal creativity. The EU
stretched the limits of its competence to conclude an agreement that, to the extent
possible, reflects the SAAs concluded with the other Western Balkan countries
without recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. Accordingly, the EU-Kosovo
SAA is fully in line with the official policy of ‘diversity on recognition but unity in
engagement’. Nevertheless, this approach is not without consequences. The choice
to opt for an EU-only agreement unavoidably affects the scope of the agreement.
This is most visible with respect to the rules regarding the entry and residence of
78 Arts 116 and 117 of the EU-Kosovo SAA.
79 See also: P. Van Elsuwege, Good Neighbourliness as a Condition for Accession to the European Union: Finding
a Balance Between Law and Politics, in Good Neighbourliness in the European Legal Context 217–234 (D.
Kochenov & E. Basheska eds, Brill Nijhoff 2015).
80 The European Reform Agenda, officially called the ‘Kosovo-EU High Level Dialogue on Key
Priorities’, was launched in Nov. 2016 and outlines priority actions in the fields of good governance
and the rule of law, competitiveness and investment climate and employment and education. See:
https://www.mei-ks.net/repository/docs/era_final.pdf (accessed 28 Jan. 2017).
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Kosovo nationals which, a priori, still belong to the competence of the EU Member
States and are, therefore, largely excluded from the EU-Kosovo SAA.81 In addi-
tion, the ‘asterisk’ solution faces obvious limits. Despite the incorporation of
Kosovo in the SAP and numerous declarations about its ‘European vocation’, it
is no coincidence that the SAA carefully avoids the explicit qualification of Kosovo
as a ‘potential candidate for EU membership’. Concluding a bilateral agreement
with a country with an asterisk is one thing but accepting a potential Member State
with an asterisk is something completely different. In other words, the asterisk
solution is an interesting tool to proceed with the development of EU-Kosovo
relations in the short term but it is not tenable in the middle to long term, at least as
far as the granting of EU membership perspectives is concerned.
It does not seem that the asterisk will ‘melt away like a snowflake’ as Edita
Tahiri, Kosovo’s chief negotiator with Serbia, argued back in 2012.82 There is no
indication that the five non-recognizing EU Member States will change their
position in the foreseeable future and the relations with Serbia remain very
strained, to say to the least.83 Hence, the end goal of an encompassing settlement
between Serbia and Kosovo, based upon a binding international agreement and
rewarded with EU membership for both, is still far away. In this context, a
pragmatic step-by-step approach focussing on the implementation of the SAA is
probably the only viable option.
81 The only exception is the fragmented EU acquis on legal migration. See Art. 86 of the EU-Kosovo
SAA.
82 Bailey, supra n. 47.
83 See for instance, the so-called ‘train row’ of Jan. 2017 when the first direct train from Belgrade to the
northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica had been painted with Serbian national colours and the phrase
‘Kosovo is Serbia’ in twenty-one languages leading to hostile exchanges between the two sides and an
intervention of EU High Representative Mogherini. See H. Salem, Kosovo, Serbia Dispute Threatens to
Derail Balkan Peace, http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-kosovo-serbia-train-dispute-eu-mogherini-
vucic-thaci/ (accessed 28 Jan. 2017).
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